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Do Asset Prices Reflect Fundamentals?
Freshly Squeezed Evidence from the FCOJ Market
Abstract
This paper reexamines frozen concentrated orange juice (FCOJ) futures returns as they relate
to fundamentals, in particular, temperature. We show that when theory clearly identiﬁes the
fundamental, i.e., at temperatures close to or below freezing, there is a close link between FCOJ
prices and that fundamental. Using a simple theoretical nonlinear model of the relation between
FCOJ returns and temperature, we can explain approximately 50% of the return variation. This is
important because while only 4.5% of the days in winter coincide with freezing temperatures, two-
thirds of the entire winter return variability occurs on these days. Moreover, when theory suggests
no such relation, i.e., at most temperature levels, we show empirically that none exists. The fact
that there is no relation the majority of the time is good news for the theory and market eﬃciency,
not bad news. In terms of other FCOJ return volatility, we also show that other fundamental
information about supply, such as USDA production forecasts and news about Brazil production,
generate signiﬁcant return variation that is consistent with theoretical predictions. The evidence
in this paper suggests that the literature’s conclusion about irrationality drawn from the FCOJ
market have more to do with econometricians’ lack of modeling ability than with the empirical
facts.
1 Introduction
There has been a ﬂurry of research that investigates whether asset returns reﬂect their fundamental
values.1 The general conclusion from this research is that the variability of these returns is much
greater than that implied by the assets’ fundamentals, i.e., information about the asset’s cash ﬂows
and expected returns. For example, regressions of asset returns on ex post information (relevant
for pricing the assets) reveals little explanatory power.
There are two primary explanations for estimated excess volatility: (i) market prices are not com-
pletely rational (i.e., they do not reﬂect fundamentals), or (ii) the relation between asset prices and
fundamental information is incorrectly measured or not measured at all (e.g., omitted variables).2
It has become popular as of late to focus on point (i) as the most reasonable explanation. In
response, market eﬃciency proponents, such as Fama (1998), have questioned the way behavioral-
based ﬁnancial economists have measured fundamentals, such as discount rates (i.e., by ignoring
risk factors) and cash ﬂows (i.e., economic versus accounting earnings). Furthermore, the research
designs of some of these previous studies have been put into question.3
Our strategy is to take one example of a market where existing empirical results have been
interpreted as being consistent with market irrationality, and to illustrate how looking at the data
in a new way can potentially overturn this interpretation. By necessity, we choose an example
where at least some of the relevant fundamental information is easy to identify, and where we have
a good idea about the functional form of the relation between fundamentals and returns. The fact
that, even in this simple setting, it is easy to erroneously conclude that fundamentals have little
explanatory power for returns, is an important warning to researchers who attempt to interpret
the evidence in markets where both fundamentals and their relation to prices are more complex.
1For example, see Roley and Troll (1983), Urich and Wachtell (1984), and Balduzzi, Elton and Green (1997) in ﬁxed
income markets; Shiller (1981), Campbell and Shiller (1984), Black (1986), Roll (1988), Cutler, Poterba and Summers
(1989), and Mitchell and Mulherin (1994) in equity markets; Frankel and Meese (1987), Ito and Roley (1987), and
Ederington and Lee (1993) in foreign exchange markets; and French, Leftwich and Uhrig (1989), Fortenberry and
Sumner (1993), and Bauer and Orazem (1994) in commodity markets.
2A third explanation could be that the data itself is mismeasured. For example, asset prices reﬂect a bid-ask
spread, which, if large enough, could lead to erroneous conclusions about the asset return’s volatility.
3For example, consider the debate generated by Kleidon (1986) and Marsh and Merton (1986) in regard to Shiller’s
(1981) excess volatility study, or, more recently, Fama’s (1998) criticism of so-called anomalies in the corporate event
study literature.
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Our example comes from one of the forerunners of the excess volatility literature–Roll’s (1984)
seminal paper on frozen concentrate orange juice (FCOJ) futures prices and weather. His paper is
unique and clever in that the fundamental information appears to be identiﬁable and exogenous.
A critical aspect of this market is that the relevant oranges for FCOJ are produced in a relatively
small region of Florida. Thus, as Roll (1984) reasonably argues, the weather in this region should
be a primary determinant of supply and thus of futures prices. Roll (1984, p.876) states that
“weather is the most identiﬁable factor inﬂuencing FCOJ returns”; however, overall, he ﬁnds little
explanatory power in the relation between FCOJ futures prices and weather. In his conclusion,
Roll (1984, p.879) states that
...weather surprises explain only a small fraction of the observed variability in futures
prices. The importance of weather is conﬁrmed by the fact that it is the most frequent
topic of stories concerning oranges in the ﬁnancial press and by the ancillary fact that
other topics are associated with even less price variability than is weather... There is a
large amount of inexplicable price volatility.
Weather’s apparent lack of explanatory power for FCOJ returns has become somewhat of a
lightning rod for the behavioral literature precisely because the fundamental information seems to
be so clear.4 For example, in recent surveys of behavioral ﬁnance
• Shleifer (2000, p.20), in a discussion about empirical challenges to eﬃcient markets, asks
“what about the basic proposition that stock prices do not react to non-information? Here
again there has been much work, but three types of ﬁndings stand out... many sharp moves
in stock prices do not appear to accompany signiﬁcant news... A similar conclusion has been
reached in two striking studies by Richard Roll (1984, 1988)...He ﬁnds that, although news
about weather helps determine future price movements, they account for a relatively small
share of these movement”;
• Hirshleifer (2001, p.1560) writes in a section covering mispricing eﬀects that “little of stock
4While Roll’s ﬁndings have subsequently been adopted by the excess volatility literature, at the time, the paper
was seen in many ways as being supportive of market eﬃciency in that it also focused on how prices rationally
incorporate all the information in weather forecasts. Moreover, while Roll identiﬁes the puzzling lack of explanatory
power, he does not argue directly that this evidence implies market irrationality.
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price or orange futures price variability has been explained empirically by relevant public
news”;
• Ross (2001, p.11) argues that “the regressions themselves have low power even when run
with the return as the dependent variable and past returns and weather forecasts as well as
contemporaneous weather changes. The R2 of these regressions is on the order of 1 or 2%. In
other words, while there is no evidence that prices do not fully incorporate past information,
we are pretty much at a loss to say why they move at all! If its not weather - which is
obviously the biggest determinant of supply changes - then what could it be?”;
• Daniel, Hirshleifer and Teoh (2002, p.172) state“only a small fraction of stock prices or orange
juice futures prices has been explained by the arrival of relevant public news. Roll (1984)
ﬁnds that the volatility of OJ futures prices was hard to explain by news about the weather”.
Why then is our interpretation of the evidence so diﬀerent? Roll (1984) performs three analyses,
looking at the relations between FCOJ futures returns and (1) temperature surprises, (2) rainfall
forecast errors, and (3) a variety of explanatory variables including temperatures, exchange rate
returns, and stock returns. With respect to temperature surprises (the diﬀerence between realized
temperatures and forecasts), he documents a statistically signiﬁcant relation, but ﬁnds R2s between
1 and 4%. Returns are informationally eﬃcient in that forecast errors are not related to future
returns, which is arguably the focus of the analysis, but the explanatory power is minimal. For
rainfall forecast errors, there is no discernible relation to returns.
Based on these results, Roll concludes that ”the small predictive power for temperature and
rainfall seems to imply that inﬂuences other than weather are aﬀecting OJ returns” (p. 875). It
is empirical evidence and statements such as these that have been interpreted by other researchers
as indicating a lack of explanatory power for fundamentals in the FCOJ futures market. How-
ever, note that these regressions, and for that matter the majority of the aforementioned excess
volatility studies, are performed in a linear framework. In contrast, agricultural theory tells us that
temperature surprises will only have a signiﬁcant impact on orange production around freezing
temperatures. Therefore, a 20 degree fall in temperature at 70 degrees has a very diﬀerent meaning
than a similar decline when the temperature is 40 degrees.5 The regression is misspeciﬁed; there-
5Roll attempts to adjust for the importance of freezes by giving greater weight to observations in winter, but this
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fore, a low R2 provides little or no evidence against market eﬃciency. With respect to rainfall,
Roll acknowledges that its eﬀect “on the crop is much less obvious than the eﬀect of temperature”
(p.873). For example, either too little or too much rainfall can have a negative impact on OJ
production and quality. Moreover, only extended periods of too little or too much rain are likely to
have a signiﬁcant eﬀect, and the magnitude of the eﬀect will depend on the timing relative to the
growing season. Is rainfall unimportant in daily regressions because markets ignore this information
or because, we, as econometricians, have inadequately modeled the true relation? It is the thesis
of this paper that the latter is more likely.
Roll also reports results from a regression of returns on a temperature freeze variable and
seven other variables including exchange rates, oil prices and stock returns. Though we take issue
with the exact form of the speciﬁcation, the identiﬁcation of the freeze variable is the appropriate
fundamental from theory. Not surprisingly, the explanatory power of this regression is greater,
although the R2 is still only 6.7%. However, as we will show, even with the correct fundamental
factor identiﬁed, it is easy to draw the wrong inference.
To illustrate our point, we document several important facts. First, the majority of the volatility
of FCOJ futures returns occurs either around freezing temperatures or on the day in October
when the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) provides its initial forecast of orange
production for the season. While these days represent less than 1.5% of the total days in our
sample, they represent 41% of the total variance. This fact alone suggests that the market does not
ignore fundamental information about production (either through weather’s eﬀect or the USDA
forecast). Second, when we are conﬁdent that we can identify the fundamental information from
theory (i.e., temperatures near or below freezing), we show that the weather has a highly nonlinear
and substantial eﬀect on futures prices. For example, R2s jump from 5% in the linear case to
close to 50% in the nonlinear case, even ignoring information about weather forecasts. In fact,
whenever we are sure we know the fundamental information, much of the price variability can be
explained by these fundamentals. In our opinion, this empirical fact provides strong evidence that
markets take into account this information for pricing. Third, though there is a remaining baseline
volatility that our temperature-based analysis cannot explain (e.g., volatility in non-winter months),
we provide anecdotal evidence that other supply factors (e.g., Brazilian production of FCOJ and
correction is inadequate to capture the degree of state dependence in the data.
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USDA production forecasts) are important. Our analysis serves to illustrate the more general
point that excess volatility estimates may have more to do with the researcher’s ability to capture
fundamentals than some view on market irrationality.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data and the basic stylized facts
about weather, production and FCOJ futures prices. This section provides strong circumstantial
evidence that these three variables are linked. In Section 3, we provide the theory for how FCOJ
prices should be related to the weather. We then go on to test the theory, and, in general, conﬁrm
the theoretical relation empirically. In particular, there is close relation between FCOJ prices and
temperature when the theory suggests there should be one. Section 4 explores the fact that there
is remaining volatility in FCOJ prices not explained by the weather. In particular, we explore the
eﬀect of other factors on FCOJ prices. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
Futures contracts in frozen concentrated orange juice (FCOJ) have traded on the New York Cotton
Exchange since September of 1967. At any given time, there are usually nine to eleven contracts
outstanding with expiration schedules every second month (January, March, May, etc.) and with
at least two January months listed at all times. The contract is for 15,000 pounds of frozen
concentrated orange juice, which represents about 2,400 ninety-pound ﬁeld boxes of oranges, with
speciﬁc requirements for color, favor, and defects. Due to these requirements, 95% of the total
U.S. processed orange production takes place in central Florida in and around the Orlando area.6
There are two types of oranges produced in the Orlando area with their main distinction being
the harvest period, namely early and mid-season (EM) varietals and Valencia oranges, which get
harvested from November through March (though primarily in January) and April though June,
respectively.
This geographic concentration is highly unusual for agricultural commodities, and allows for a
6California is also a large producer of oranges; however, oranges produced in that region are not suitable for FCOJ.
Internationally, Brazil is, along with the U.S., the largest producer of oranges used for FCOJ. While Brazil primarily
exports these oranges to countries other than the U.S., the majority of Florida production is consumed domestically.
Though Brazilian oranges are subject to signiﬁcant tariﬀs, they can provide a close substitute to Florida oranges.
The issue of Brazil’s production and how it aﬀects the FCOJ market is discussed in Section 4.2.
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unique opportunity to study the interaction between asset returns (i.e., FCOJ futures prices) and
an important exogenous variable (i.e., Orlando weather). Ex ante there are strong reasons why
weather should be an important variable for FCOJ prices and why Roll’s (1984) result is such a
puzzle. In particular, freezes can have devastating eﬀects on orange production. Attaway (1997)
cites several freezes over the past 170 years that have had a major impact on fruit production.
A full list of the impact freezes is provided in Table 1. For example, in the freeze of February
7-9, 1835, temperatures dropped to as low as 11 degrees in northern Florida, destroying almost all
existing orange trees. In fact, prior to this date, a number of more northern states (such as South
Carolina and Georgia) produced oranges. The freeze of 1835 essentially forever ended the desire to
produce oranges in those states. In the decade from 1894 to 1905, Florida was hit by ten freezes,
one of which (February 8, 1895 when the temperature reached 17 degrees) led to almost all the
orange crop being destroyed. In 1893-94, 5.06 million boxes of oranges were produced; by 1895-96,
production had fallen to 0.147 million boxes (Attaway (1997)). The industry did not fully recover
until 1909-10. Of interest to this paper, Table 1 shows that a number of freezes occurred during
our sample period, that is, post 1967.
We collected data from September 1967 to December 1998 on several series: (i) the minimum
temperature in Orlando, (ii) a limited amount of minimum temperature forecasts from the National
Weather Service (primarily for winter months and for only some of the years within our sample),
(iii) USDA production forecasts, and (iv) FCOJ futures prices, volume and open interest on every
contract. We also collected other relevant data series such as Brazilian orange production and
FCOJ exports to the U.S., FCOJ pack and movement information, and news events associated
with FCOJ. We describe the majority of the data in detail as it becomes relevant throughout the
paper.
2.1 Orlando Weather
The most important fundamental for FCOJ prices is the presence of a production shock to a given
year’s orange crop. The largest factor in this regard is weather, and, in particular, winter freezes.
As mentioned above, winter freezes can severely impact orange production, thus raising the prices
of oranges in the commodity market.
Figure 1 graphs the minimum temperature in Orlando, Florida from 1967 through the end of
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1998. Over 80% of the winter years include days (and, in many cases, multiple days) with temper-
atures close to or below freezing during periods relevant for orange juice production. Speciﬁcally,
within our sample period of thirty-one winters, only six winters can be strictly described as com-
pletely freeze-free winters. Twenty-ﬁve winters experienced one or more nights when the minimum
temperature dipped to 32 degrees or below. Approximately 50% of the winters have two to three
nights of freeze, and the probability of four or more freeze nights is approximately 25%. Thus,
there is clearly a considerable amount of return-relevant information during the winter season.
However, it is important to point out that not every freeze has material consequences for the
orange crop. As mentioned above, Attaway (1997) provides a detailed description of the history
of impact freezes that happened in Florida over the past 170 years (see Table 1). While Table 1
documents the actual dates of these freezes, Table 2 describes the critical conditions for freezes to
have a substantial eﬀect on production. These conditions are basically the temperature itself and
the duration of this temperature level.7 For example, if the temperature falls below 28 degrees for
six hours or more, then, without intervention, there will be extensive damage done to the oranges,
and hence production of FCOJ. With respect to our particular sample period, according to Attaway
(1997), there are eleven relevant freeze seasons, some of which are multiple, from 1967 to 1998.8 The
identiﬁcation of these freezes will form the basis for our comparison between freeze and non-freeze
years.
2.2 Production
The documentation of severe freezes in Table 1 and the theory of freeze impacts in Table 2 suggest
that production of FCOJ should be impacted by the weather. Every October, the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) provides forecasts of the upcoming season’s orange production.
This forecast is conditioned on a non-freeze season, that is, the USDA does not take into account
the possibility of a freeze when forming its forecast.
7Of course, the magnitude of a freeze alone is not suﬃcient to explain the impact on prices. Also important are
coincidental eﬀects on the determinants of the supply of Florida FCOJ substitutes such as imported FCOJ from
Brazil. Examples of these eﬀects are whether there was a drought in the Sao Paolo area of Brazil, tariﬀ rates, and
the costs of transportation.
8In a separate study by Hebert (1993), similar freezes are also identiﬁed using diﬀerent freeze identiﬁcation
methodology.
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Table 3 documents the percentage diﬀerence between the October USDA forecast and ﬁnal
production, which is generally reported in August of the following year, for all the years in our
30-year sample. Freeze years, as classiﬁed by Attaway (1997), are noted, and we also report the
average across the 11 freeze years and 19 non-freeze years. Several observations are of interest.
First, the USDA’s forecasts in non-freeze years are nearly unbiased, with only a 1.3% diﬀerence on
average between the forecast and the realization. However, there is substantial variation in forecast
accuracy, with underestimates and overestimates as large as 6.2% and 8.1%, respectively. Second,
and most important, there is a considerable reduction in orange production in freeze years, with
12.7% less production than forecast. Again, there is substantial variation, with a maximum decline
of 30.5%. If the demand for oranges is downward sloping and there is no perfect substitute for
Florida oranges (at the prevailing price), then the spot price of oranges should rise in response to
a decline in supply. Given the economic laws of supply and demand, therefore, futures prices on
FCOJ should move in the same direction.
2.3 Futures Prices
In order to investigate the eﬀect of freezes on prices, we obtained daily closing prices of FCOJ
futures from September 1967 to August 1998. On each trading day prices of the three near maturity
contracts were collected from Bridge/CRB and Datastream. We also collected volume and open
interest data. There are a number of ways to generate a continuous return series from the three
price series. In general, we attempt to get the most accurate proxy for price changes in spot FCOJ
prices. We need to take into consideration two important characteristics of futures’ prices that may
aﬀect the accuracy of calculated returns - liquidity and limit days. First, it is well known that near
maturity contracts are the most liquid, a fact that we veriﬁed with the volume and open interest
data. However, liquidity diminishes rapidly as a contract comes close to expiration, particularly in
the expiration month. These factors were considered in constructing the continuous return series.
A second issue is that price moves on futures contracts are limited by the exchange. The magnitude
of these price limits and the contracts to which they applied changed over the course of our sample,
but the general impact of price limits is to prevent prices from fully incorporating information on
days with important information releases. We adjust for this phenomenon in the standard way by
aggregating returns over consecutive days with price moves that hit either the lower or upper limit.
8
For example, when a severe freeze occurs, the price may hit the upper limit for 4 consecutive days.
In this case, we aggregate returns over these 4 days plus the next day, which is a no-limit day, and
use this as the 1-day return. The precise algorithm we use to construct the spliced data series is
described in the appendix.
Given this continuous daily return series, Table 3 provides the cumulative return over the winter
season (December through February) for each year and the average of these returns for freeze and
non-freeze years. The average return is almost 19% higher in freeze than in non-freeze years,
namely 12.7% versus -6.1%, although there is substantial variation in returns on an annual basis.
This suggests that, on average, futures prices are indeed higher in years in which production has
been impacted negatively.
It is also worthwhile documenting some additional stylized facts that provide substantial cir-
cumstantial evidence of an important relation between FCOJ futures prices and temperature. Table
4, Panel A reports the volatility of daily FCOJ returns in diﬀerent seasons. The variance of FCOJ
futures returns in winter months is four times that of returns in spring and summer months and
three times higher than in the fall season. This is not surprising as freezes only occur in winter
months. A slightly diﬀerent way of viewing the data is to note that more than 50% of the total
variance of returns is accounted for by the winter season. When the mean returns are the same
across diﬀerent categories, as they are approximately across seasons, this variance decomposition
can be calculated simply by multiplying the daily variance by the number of observations in any
season. We also divided the winter season into two separate periods: pre-freeze and post-freeze.
The pre-freeze period includes days up to an including the ﬁrst freeze of the season in a freeze
season and all the days in a non-freeze season; the post-freeze period includes the days subsequent
to a freeze in a freeze season. Note that the post-freeze period can include a second freeze, and, in
fact, two seasons had multiple freezes (see Table 1). Interestingly, the variability in winter months
is greater pre-freeze than post-freeze in spite of the fact that freeze frequencies are similar in the
two periods. Of course, this phenomenon may be due to the fact that the second freeze in a sea-
son happened to be less severe in our sample. Alternatively, the second freeze in a season may
be less important because damage has already been done to the orange crop. Due to uncertainty
surrounding the impact of multiple freezes, the remainder of the paper focuses on the period up to
and including the ﬁrst freeze of the season, i.e., the pre-freeze period.
9
The fact that winter months produce greater variation in futures prices does not in itself suggest
a relation between temperature and FCOJ prices. As shown in Tables 1 and 2, the main impact on
production comes from a particular event, namely a freeze. Thus, it is the change in the likelihood
of a freeze that should move FCOJ futures prices. Table 4, Panel B presents the volatility of FCOJ
futures prices in winter months conditional on various contemporaneous minimum temperature
realizations, namely 35 degrees and below, 36-40 degrees, 41-45 degrees and 46 degrees and above.
As can be seen from the table, at or around freezing temperatures (i.e., 35 and below), the daily
standard deviation of FCOJ returns is 11.81% compared to between 1.79% and 2.16% for the other
temperature buckets. That is, there is over 50 times greater variance in FCOJ futures returns near
freezing temperatures than when temperatures are warmer. As a result, in spite of the fact that
there are only 77 observations at these low temperatures (5.2% of the winter pre-freeze sample and
1.0% of the total sample), these observations account for almost 70% of the variance in the winter
pre-freeze period and over one third of the total variance.9 This result strongly suggests that freezes
have a substantial impact of FCOJ futures pricing.
While there are many factors that can aﬀect the FCOJ futures price, Tables 3 and 4 show that
(i) much of the variability in FCOJ prices occurs around freezes, and (ii) the movement in FCOJ
prices seems to be in the right direction as characterized by the laws of supply and demand. In
the next section, we provide the theory and empirical results that demonstrate a strong relation
between FCOJ futures prices and temperature. We also show why the literature has mistakenly
concluded no relation exists.
3 FCOJ Prices and Temperature: Theory and Results
Because storage costs of oranges and, in particular, FCOJ are high, only a fraction of the juice
gets carried forward from year-to-year. Therefore, long-run shifts in either demand or supply,
are expected to have little impact on FCOJ prices. What are the major factors aﬀecting FCOJ
prices? The agricultural literature has identiﬁed three major determinants of prices. First, as
mentioned above, short-run shocks to the production of oranges shift the supply curve and move
9These variance decomposition calculations are slightly more complicated than those across seasons because the
mean returns diﬀer across temperature levels. Consequently, sums of squared deviations are calculated using the
overall mean.
10
prices. Second, due to there being worldwide production of oranges suitable for FCOJ, the ability
of distributors to shift away from Florida oranges to other sources also aﬀects prices. In particular,
Brazil is the largest exporter of oranges worldwide. Given tariﬀs in the U.S. on these oranges, as
well as transportation costs, the prices of Brazilian oranges can have a major impact on the available
supply in the U.S. The U.S. also imports orange juice from Mexico and the Caribbean, and these
countries, in general, face lower tariﬀs. However, their production is substantially lower than that
of Brazil. Third, there could be short-run demand shifts either to or away from FCOJ. Competing
products include other citrus juices, such as grapefruit juice, lemonade or freshly squeezed orange
juice, and other fruit juices such as apple juice.
If these are the major factors aﬀecting the demand and supply of FCOJ, and, therefore, the
underlying price, the question remains whether these factors get rationally incorporated into the
day-to-day movement in the prices of ﬁnancial assets, i.e., futures prices on FCOJ. As described
in the introduction, there is a growing literature that argues asset prices have excess volatility due
to irrational behavior on the part of economic agents. While some of this excess volatility could
be due to typical market-microstructure biases, the argument is that the volatility is too large to
justify this possibility.
In this section, we focus on what economic theory would tell us about the relation between
FCOJ futures price changes and supply shocks due to temperature (freezes), while we address
other potential factors in Section 4. As a starting point, the stylized facts of Section 2 are quite
informative. First, over 80% of the years have freezing weather in Orlando, Florida (Figure 1).
Moreover, 40% of these years are considered freeze years (Table 1); that is, years in which the
temperature was low enough for a long enough time to be relevant for orange production. Second,
adjusting for expectations about production, there is a 14% diﬀerence in production levels for
freeze versus non-freeze years (Table 3). Consistent with agricultural theory, this result conﬁrms
that freezes have substantial impacts on U.S.-based production. Third, with respect to ﬁnancial
markets, the distribution of futures returns diﬀers in freeze versus non-freeze years. Speciﬁcally,
returns are on average 19% higher in freeze years (Table 3). This evidence is consistent with
ﬁnancial markets relating asset prices to the fundamentals, i.e., futures prices are much higher in
years with negative shocks to production. Fourth, the majority of the well-documented variation
in futures returns occurs in the temperature region one would expect, namely around freezing
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temperatures (Table 4B). For example, while only 5.2% of the winter pre-freeze days are in this
region, 69.4% of the variance in futures returns occurs on these days.
Given these four facts, it seems surprising that one of the major results in the excess volatility
literature is the lack of explanatory power in the relation between FCOJ futures and temperature. In
a rational market the FCOJ futures return over a given period should reﬂect changes in expectations
about the level of short-run production, i.e., the supply shocks over that period. With respect to
temperature, these shocks correspond to changes in the market’s perceived likelihood and severity
of a freeze.
Perhaps the literature has found little or no relation because the change in likelihood of a freeze
is a diﬃcult variable for the econometrician to measure. Clearly, there is no theoretical reason
to believe that the relation between FCOJ futures returns and temperature surprises is linear. In
fact, there is considerable reason to believe this is not the case. Speciﬁcally, consider the following
points:
• The change in likelihood of a freeze clearly depends very diﬀerently on a number of factors.
First, and foremost, a freeze is going to be seasonal as fall, spring and summer months are
unlikely to produce freezing weather in Florida. Second, a temperature surprise, or change
in temperature, will only matter around freezing temperatures. That is, a 10-degree surprise
at 70 degrees has very diﬀerent implications for the likelihood and severity of a freeze than it
does at a temperature of 35 degrees. Even during winter, at most temperature levels, theory
tells us that there is no relation between FCOJ prices and temperature. The relation exists
only to the extent we learn new information about the likelihood and severity of a freeze.
• The distribution of orange production should diﬀer depending on whether a freeze has oc-
curred or not. For example, if a freeze has a substantial impact on orange production, then
another freeze may be expected to have less impact to the extent the damage is already done.
Of course, this depends on the relative severity of the freezes, the timing of the harvests, etc.
In addition, conditional on a freeze, the uncertainty regarding its eﬀects on production can
be quite high until the damage is surveyed.
• The severity of a freeze depends on two factors: (i) the level of the temperature, and (ii)
the duration of a freeze. Table 2 provides a brief description of these relevant factors. In
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particular, the severity of a freeze is not linear in temperature, as 30-31 degree temperatures
have relatively mild eﬀects compared to the 27-29 degree range. In the latter instance, there
is severe damage done to both the leaves and fruit, which dramatically aﬀects production.
In the next subsection, we try and relate these theories more closely to the data by explicitly
incorporating some of these ideas into an empirical analysis of futures prices and temperature.
3.1 A First Look
While it is diﬃcult for the econometrician to measure changes in the market’s perceived likelihood
and severity of a freeze, there is one instance in which this is straightforward to do, that is, when a
freeze actually occurs. In this case, the likelihood is probability one and the severity of the freeze
maps to the temperature level. Even in this simpliﬁed case, the temperature level is just one of two
pieces of information. The other piece is the length of time at each temperature level, which we
discuss in the next subsection. Of course, market participants have access to greater information
such as verbal assessments of the probable freeze damage.
If one assumes that the conditional probability of a freeze is constant, then the realization of a
freeze and its corresponding temperature level will measure the “freeze surprise” and therefore the
supply shock (albeit functionally). There are strong reasons to question the assumption that the
probability of a freeze is constant. For example, at the very least, the probability will vary with
the time of the year. However, more important, there is information provided to the marketplace
about the likelihood and severity of freezes throughout the year. In particular, the U.S. National
Weather Service provides 12, 24 and 72 hour forecasts that the market should incorporate in its
assessment. These issues are addressed in the next subsection in some detail.
The functional form of the return-temperature relation is unknown, but is certainly nonlinear.
We assume that such a relation exists, and attempt to characterize the function empirically. We
investigate four diﬀerent speciﬁcations for this relation.
The ﬁrst model is linear:
Rt = α + βWt + t,
where Rt is the close-to-close return and Wt is the contemporaneous realized minimum tempera-
ture. Thus, the return and the minimum temperature are aligned in time. We consider this the
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benchmark model. The clear problem with the linear model is that it imposes the same relation
between returns and temperature at temperatures both above and below freezing.
In contrast, an alternative speciﬁcation, the piecewise linear model, estimates a number of linear
relations, each for a diﬀerent temperature bucket,
Rt =
N∑
n=1
Dnt(αn + βnWt) + t,
where the dummy variable, Dnt, equals one for Wt ∈ (W nmin, W nmax] and zero otherwise. Each
return-temperature pair is placed in a temperature bucket and is used in estimation of the relevant
coeﬃcients αn and βn. In theory, this model provides complete ﬂexibility. Given enough data the
econometrician can specify a large number of small buckets, eﬀectively estimating the functional
form of the relationship piece-by-piece. Note that we do not impose the restriction that the lines
connect at the bucket borders.
The most general model estimates an unspeciﬁed functional form linking returns to temperature:
Rt = f(Wt) + t.
In this paper, we estimate this functional form using the kernel regression methodology described
in Ullah (1988) and others. The kernel estimation provides a standard nonparametric regression of
returns on realized temperatures based on nonparametric density estimation. The econometrician
chooses the kernel function and the bandwidth or degree of smoothing. The results are insensitive
to the choice of kernel function and we use a normal density. The bandwidth is chosen via cross-
validation. Speciﬁcally, we estimate the ﬁtted returns at each temperature observation in the data
using all the observations except that speciﬁc point and choose the bandwidth that minimizes the
resulting mean squared error.
Finally, the fourth model imposes priors on the functional form. This nonlinear model is in the
spirit of Roll (1984), i.e., using the relevant theory in a parsimonious way. The speciﬁcation,
Rt = α + β1Max(0, W ∗ −Wt) + β2[(Max(0, W ∗ −Wt))]2 + t,
is a second order polynomial in the regressor Max(0, W ∗ −Wt), where W ∗ represents the critical
temperature threshold. In our analysis, we use 32 degrees as this threshold, although the results
are insensitive to any reasonable choice. To the extent FCOJ prices are not aﬀected by non-
freezing temperatures, the regressor is zero. Then, as the temperature gets below a certain level,
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the regressor rises quickly as the temperature falls. Thus, this model incorporates the nonlinearity
implied by the theory of freeze impacts described in Table 2. Roll also uses the variable Max(0, 32−
Wt), although he does not include the squared term and he includes a variety of other variables
including exchange rates, oil prices and stock returns.
Table 5 presents the results for these four diﬀerent speciﬁcations estimated using the winter
pre-freeze sample. The results are in stark contrast to the existing literature’s view of the relation
between FCOJ futures prices and temperature (e.g., Shleifer (2000) and Hirshleifer (2001), among
others). First, while temperature is statistically signiﬁcant in the linear model, it is clear that the
evidence derives almost entirely from low temperatures. The piecewise linear models show that
weather only matters at low temperatures. Of course, this is precisely what the theory would
predict. That is, in terms of the weather, it is only information about a freeze, in this case, the
realization of one, that matters.
Second, the R2s jump from 1.5% for the linear model to as high as 33.3% and 33.6% for the
nonlinear model and kernel nonparametric models, respectively. Thus, across the entire winter
pre-freeze period, over one-third of the variation can now be explained. To get a ﬁner partition of
the explanatory power of weather, Figure 2 breaks up the R2s into diﬀerent temperature buckets.
This partitioning is important because the theory suggests that weather should only matter at
low temperatures. The results conﬁrm this theoretical prediction, with the more general models
capturing close to 50% of the return variation for temperatures of 35 degrees and below. In fact,
outside of the low temperature ranges, there is almost no relation between weather and FCOJ
futures returns. Note that the linear model produces negative R2s for the three higher temperature
ranges. A negative R2 is possible because we estimate the model on all the data and then calculate
the R2 for speciﬁc groups of observations sorted by temperature. In theory, the other globally
estimated models (the nonlinear and nonparametric models) could also produce negative R2s in
some regions, but the actual R2s are positive but close to zero.
Given an R2 of close to 50% in the temperature range that accounts for about one third of the
total variance of returns (see Table 4), we would expect the regression model to have an R2 of 16%
when estimated over the full sample. This prediction is conﬁrmed by the results reported at the
bottom of Table 5. Why is this number substantially higher than the 6.7% R2 reported by Roll
(Table 10, p.877)? There are two contributing factors–the absence of the squared term and the fact
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that Roll does not aggregate limit moves for this regression (although he does so elsewhere in his
analysis). The former is responsible for about 2% of the diﬀerence, as shown in the ﬁnal regression
in Table 5, while the latter presumably accounts for the remainder.
These results show that researchers need to be cautious in how they interpret the relation be-
tween asset prices and fundamentals. In this case, the theory predicts a strong relation only under
certain conditions, i.e., freezing temperatures. In fact, when those conditions are met, the R2s are
very high. These R2s are all the more remarkable given the simple nature of the models, which
ignore both market forecasts and speciﬁc information about the freeze, such as its duration. The
existing literature concludes that temperature has limited explanatory power for FCOJ futures
returns because it implicitly focuses on the 99% of observations that by theory have no predicted
no relation. The aggregation of these into one simple linear model across all observations drowns
out the strong theoretical relation between FCOJ prices and temperature. Even a nonlinear speci-
ﬁcation produces results that must be interpreted carefully when they are generated over the full
sample. The fact that there is no relation between temperature and returns 99% of the time is
good news for the theory and market eﬃciency, not bad news.
Third, the theory predicts that the relation between FCOJ futures returns and the temperature
should be nonlinear. As the temperature drops further below freezing, the impact on production
(duration of the freeze aside) should be more severe. The regression results of Table 5 strongly
support the nonlinear nature of the theoretical relation. The coeﬃcient on the nonlinear term in the
polynomial regression is highly signiﬁcant with a t-statistic of approximately 7. Figure 3 graphs the
ﬁtted relations of all four models, and both the kernel regression and nonlinear speciﬁcation show a
highly convex relation between FCOJ returns and freezing temperature levels. The piecewise linear
model captures the convexity between freezing and above freezing temperature but fails to capture
the convexity within the low temperature region. Further subdividing the low temperature range
may permit a better ﬁt, i.e., less misspeciﬁcation, but estimation error would also increase.
3.2 Another Look
The results of Section 3.1 are in stark contrast to the existing literature’s view about weather
and FCOJ returns. That is, when theory expects a strong relation between FCOJ futures returns
and temperature, the data strongly supports it. One should note, however, that the R2s are on
16
the order of 50%. This suggests there is substantial variation left to be explained. Of course, the
empirical models in Section 3.1 ignore potentially important information and assume that the actual
temperature describes the entire shift in the likelihood of there being a freeze and its magnitude.
While the true likelihood will be diﬃcult for the researcher to uncover, it is possible to gather more
evidence on the true functional form. In particular, beyond the actual realization of a freeze, what
other information might be helpful in describing the shift in the freeze likelihood?
3.2.1 Forecasts
One issue, highlighted by Roll, is the fact that the market also has access to temperature forecasts.
He looks at the relation between returns and temperature surprises (the diﬀerence between the
realized temperature and the forecast), but he does not focus on these surprises when freezing
temperatures are either predicted or realized, i.e., when they will tell us something about the
market’s change in perception of the likelihood of a freeze. Theory suggests that this is the only
time when forecasts should matter. We rectify this omission by using freeze related temperatures
and forecasts and by examining R2s for diﬀerent groups of observations as above. The intuition
for the role of forecasts is simple. For example, if the market knew with probability one that there
would be a freeze the next day, then the actual realization would have no information. That is,
all the price movement would occur the day before. Thus, the model of Section 3.1, which ignores
forecasts, is a lower bound on the true model’s ability to explain the relation between FCOJ futures
returns and temperature.
There are two primary ways forecasts can impact FCOJ futures returns. First, as described
in the extreme example above, forecasts measure the current expectation, though not the entire
distribution, of the future temperature and thus contain information about a freeze. Thus, FCOJ
futures returns might move prior to the realization of a freeze because the market’s likelihood of a
freeze has already incorporated the forecast. Second, the actual realization of the temperature might
be a surprise relative to the forecast, which also signals a shift in the likelihood (and magnitude) of
a freeze. For example, consider the case in which FCOJ returns are negative when we get positive
surprises in the weather, that is, a freeze was forecasted but one did not materialize. This is a case
that we do not even try to explain in Section 3.1. Alternatively, there are cases when the freeze
was either worse or better than expected relative to the forecast. This too in theory would cause
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a shift in the distribution of the freeze magnitude and thus FCOJ returns.
Forecasts are only relevant to the extent that the National Weather Service has some forecasting
power. Roll (1984) provides a detailed examination of the NWS’s forecasting ability, and, in
general, ﬁnds they produce unbiased forecasts with R2s on the order of 50%. We duplicate Roll’s
tests for a limited 10-year sample of National Weather Service (NWS) temperature forecasts of the
next-day minimum temperature for the Orlando area and also look at a time series approach to
temperature forecasting. We estimate two basic types of regressions, one including lagged minimum
temperatures and forecasts of the form
Wt = α + β1Wt−1 + β2Wt−2 + γFt−1(Wt) + t
and one including lagged temperatures and monthly dummy variables of the form
Wt = αiDit + β1Wt−1 + β2Wt−2 + t,
where Ft−1(Wt) is the one-day ahead forecast and Dit are monthly dummies. We only consider
two temperature lags because further lags add little or nothing to the explanatory power of the
regressions. Also, we do not include monthly dummies in the forecast regressions because again
they do not signiﬁcantly improve the ﬁt. The estimation results are reported in Table 6. It is
important to note that the pure time series regressions are run only on winter season data and that
the forecast regressions are for November through March. Variability is much higher in the winter
months and forecastability is much lower.
There are several interesting results from the regressions. First, the NWS forecast is not condi-
tionally unbiased since the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1, but this may simply be due
to rounding in high temperature regions. It is obvious from looking at the data that the NWS
often rounds to the nearest 5 degrees when minimum temperatures are high. However, the forecast
is quite powerful with an R2 of 56%. Second, lagged temperatures appear to provide additional
forecasting power, increasing the R2 to 73%, although again NWS rounding may be an issue. Min-
imum temperatures are persistent, and a fall (rise) in minimum temperatures over the previous 2
days suggests a continuing downward (upward) trend as indicated by the negative coeﬃcient on
the second lag, although this coeﬃcient is marginally signiﬁcant at best. Third, when forecast data
is unavailable, monthly temperature dummies are extremely signiﬁcant, but persistence and trend
continuation are still evident. The R2 is a meaningful 41%. These latter results are consistent with
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the time series evidence in Campbell and Diebold (2001), who use a much larger sample to forecast
temperatures in 10 U.S. cities (although not Orlando).
Unfortunately, the overall ability of the models to forecast temperature is not that relevant.
What matters is their ability to forecast temperatures in the freezing range, since that is the only
temperature level that aﬀects production and thus FCOJ pricing. That is, the models may be very
eﬃcient at predicting 50-degree nights in Florida, but what market participants care about is their
ability to predict 25-degree nights. On this issue the pure time series model is essentially useless.
It never predicts freezes due to the strong reversion to a monthly mean that is well above freezing,
even in January. Similarly, the time series augmentation of the NWS forecast does not appear to
help in predicting freezes. Perhaps a better way to look at the data is to examine conditional freeze
probabilities, which are reported at the bottom of Table 6. The unconditional probability of a
freeze is 0.7%. This probability rises to 2.66% in winter and 4.75% in January. Do NWS forecasts
help predict freezes? When the forecast is 32 degrees or below, the probability of observing a freeze
the following day is 43.75%. The NWS clearly has some, though clearly imperfect, ability to predict
freeze-level temperatures. Lagged temperatures also have predictive power. If the temperature is
currently freezing, there is a 32% probability that it will freeze tomorrow as well. Even when it is
cold but above freezing, the conditional probability of a freeze of 6.7% is above the January baseline
level. Nevertheless, temperature observations do not appear to have much meaningful predictive
power after taking NWS forecasts into account.
The NWS’s forecasting ability aside, the remainder of this section explores how well forecast
information explains FCOJ return variability. We use the following methodology to investigate
this issue. First, we generate a set of pricing errors from the kernel regression pricing model of
Section 2.1. That is, we take the FCOJ futures return minus the ﬁtted value. We then look at
whether forecasts can help improve the model, either through forecasting future freezes or through
temperature surprises, by regressing the pricing errors on the forecast information. If forecasts are
not helpful, then the R2s and coeﬃcients should be close to zero. If forecasts are helpful, then
we could in principle incorporate them in a more complete model of FCOJ returns. However, our
limited sample of forecast data prevents us from estimating a multi-dimensional nonlinear model
with any accuracy.
Table 7 reports results from regressing the pricing errors on information about forecasts through
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two diﬀerent sources: (i) forecasts today of freezing temperatures tomorrow, and (ii) realizations
of freezing temperatures tomorrow.10 We also break up the sample into periods in which either a
freeze was forecasted or a freeze occurred. That is, we consider both univariate and multivariate
versions of the regression,
t = α + β1Max[0, 32 − Ft(Wt+1)] + β2Max[0, 32 −Wt+1] + νt,
where t is the pricing error from the nonparametric regression, Max[0, 32−Ft(Wt+1)] is tomorrow’s
forecast of a freeze, and Max[0, 32−Wt+1] is the realization of a freeze. The table also reports R2s
calculated within buckets, sorted by the forecast or the future realized temperature.
The overall conclusion from the table is that forecasts have signiﬁcant but not overwhelming
explanatory power for returns, i.e., the relation between FCOJ futures returns and temperature
is even stronger than implied by Section 3.1. In the regression of returns on contemporaneous
forecasts of tomorrow’s minimum temperature, the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant and has the correct sign
(i.e., forecasts of lower temperatures generate higher positive returns), and the R2 is 17% in the
only relevant bucket (i.e., when the forecast is low). When used on its own, the future temperature
has limited explanatory power (e.g., 4% in the relevant temperature range for the regression that
uses the full set of winter pre-freeze data) but the correct sign. When both the forecast and future
temperature are combined, the R2 jumps to 24% in the relevant forecast bucket, although the
coeﬃcient on the future temperature reverses sign. This sign reversal is puzzling, but it may be
attributable to a combination of multicollinearity between the two variables and the relatively small
sample size in the relevant region.
As an alternative, Table 8 investigates whether temperature forecast surprises help explain the
kernel regression model’s pricing errors, and thus potentially improve the model’s ﬁt. Because in
theory the temperature surprise has a diﬀerent eﬀect depending on whether a freeze was forecast
and/or realized, we consider error analysis regressions of the following sort:
t = α + β1I1,tZt + β2I2,tZt + β3I3,tZt + β4I4,tZt + νt
where
Zt = Wt − Ft−1(Wt)
10The latter piece of information can be broken up into the forecast and the unexpected component of the temper-
ature. We include this latter variable as a noisy signal of the forecast because we have data for the entire sample.
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I1,t = 1 for Ft−1(Wt) ≤ 32o and Wt > 32o, 0 otherwise
I2,t = 1 for Ft−1(Wt) ≤ 32o and Wt ≤ 32o, 0 otherwise
I3,t = 1 for Ft−1(Wt) > 32o and Wt ≤ 32o, 0 otherwise
I4,t = I1,t + I2,t + I3,t.
The R2s are calculated within buckets, sorted by the forecast or the temperature. Forecast surprises
seem to matter under two circumstances–when a freeze was forecast and realized, and when a freeze
occurred but was not forecast. The former case generates a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient (β2),
as predicted by the theory, and is responsible for the 24% R2 in the low forecast bucket. When the
freeze was more severe than predicted, returns are higher. The latter case generates a signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient of the wrong sign and is responsible for the 27% R2 in the 41 to 45 degree forecast bucket.
When the observations are sorted by temperature, the explanatory power of these two regressors is
combined in the low temperature bucket, with a resulting R2 of 31%. Although this estimation is
carried out on a limited sample due to the unavailability of extensive forecast data, one could think
of extrapolating the results to the full sample. Speciﬁcally, the contemporaneous temperature alone
explains approximately 50% of the variation of returns in the low temperature region (see Figure
2), and the temperature surprise explains approximately one third of the remaining variation. The
combined explanatory power is therefore approximately 65%. In other words, the contemporaneous
minimum temperature plus the temperature surprise (relative to the previous day’s forecast) can
explain almost two thirds of the return variation in by far the most volatile subset of days, namely
when temperatures are low.
3.2.2 What’s Missing?
Realized temperatures alone explain a signiﬁcant fraction of variation in FCOJ futures returns, and
forecasts contribute additional explanatory power. Nevertheless, there is still some unexplained
variation in returns in winter months relative to the spring and summer. There are three possible
explanations for this phenomenon.
First, the realized temperature minimum temperature may not be a perfect proxy for the severity
of the freeze. Table 2 indicates that freeze duration is also an important variable. In an attempt to
address this issue, we analyzed hourly Orlando temperatures, as provided by the National Weather
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Service, during freeze episodes for the 1983-1998 period. Using these data, we constructed a number
of measures of duration based on the critical temperature levels in Table 2. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
our duration measures were highly correlated with the minimum temperatures. As a result, given
the small sample size, it was impossible to detect a signiﬁcant eﬀect.
Second, the severity of the freeze may not be a perfect proxy for the resulting supply shock for
a number of reasons. For example, the timing of the freeze is important, especially with respect
to the EM varietals, which are harvested primarily in January. In our sample, the earliest freeze
is in late December and the latest is in late February (see Table 1). Clearly, even controlling for
severity, these freezes will not have the same impact on production. There is also the possibility of
time dependence. Freezes that occur in years following a freeze year or sequence of freeze years may
have diﬀerent eﬀects on production. In addition, there is a degree of nonstationarity induced by the
fact the Florida orange production has gradually been moving southward over the sample period.
Orlando temperatures are slowly becoming less relevant, and freezes are generally becoming less
of an issue. Tables 1 and 3 provide casual evidence of these combined eﬀects. There is far from a
one-to-one correspondence between the minimum temperature reported in Table 1 and the change
in the production forecast reported in Table 3. Moreover, looking more closely at the monthly
production forecast updates leads to the same conclusion. Ideally, we would relate daily returns to
the market’s daily unexpected production shock, but this latter variable is unavailable. However,
we do look more closely at the monthly production forecast data in the next section.
Finally, even knowing the shock to the market’s production forecast is not suﬃcient. The impact
on returns of a given shock to production will depend on a variety of other factors. For example,
the shape of the demand curve will inﬂuence the price eﬀect of a ﬁxed production shock, given
diﬀerent initial levels of anticipated supply. The availability and price of substitutes (e.g., imports
from Brazil, Mexico and the Caribbean) will also inﬂuence the price impact. This availability is
itself determined by myriad other factors, including the weather in other orange growing regions
and tariﬀs, which changed considerably over the sample period. We take a look at some of these
factors in the next section.
Given the complexities outlined above, the explanatory power we document using a simple and
naive model is even more remarkable.
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4 Other Components of FCOJ Return Variation
The results of Sections 2 and 3 demonstrate three important results: (i) there is large variation in
FCOJ futures returns consistent with theory, i.e., around freezing temperatures, (ii) the relation
between FCOJ futures returns and temperature conforms to theory, being nonlinear and convex at
temperatures around 32 degrees and below, and (iii) other information, such as forecasts, have an
important (though diﬃcult to measure) impact on FCOJ futures returns.
We can use these results to better understand the sources of return variation of FCOJ futures
returns. Consider Table 4A, which decomposes the variance of FCOJ returns by season. Approxi-
mately 50% of all the variance comes in winter months, 20% in fall months, and the remaining 30%
is shared equally between spring and summer months. To the extent we can explain almost 35%
of the variance in the winter months with the simple model (and more using forecast data), the
winter variation reduces to the baseline FCOJ futures return variation of the other months. More-
over, freezing temperature observations represent only 4.3% of winter months, but they account for
almost two-thirds of winter return variance. In fact, they represent only 1% of all the observations
yet capture one-third of all return variance!
Given our empirical results, there is no puzzle about the relation between temperature and
FCOJ futures returns; it conforms to exactly what one would expect. Ideally, we would like to
be able to explain the remaining return variation, but the thesis of this paper is that, in general,
econometricians do not do a good job of modeling complex relations, especially in the absence of
strong and reliable theory. We are no diﬀerent in this respect. In fact, we would argue that as
a profession, we sometimes have trouble modeling and interpreting simple relations (e.g., consider
the aforementioned behavioral literature). Nevertheless, even without knowing the true model, it
is possible to show that the underlying economics in the FCOJ futures market may be working
rationally with respect to some other important factors. We leave to other research issues related
to (i) the microstructure of this market, (ii) the stochastic convenience yield of futures, and (iii)
the demand for FCOJ, although these factors may certainly be important.11 Instead, we focus
on FCOJ-speciﬁc supply-based factors, namely (i) news about Florida FCOJ production, and (ii)
news about Brazil’s FCOJ production. We provide some rudimentary evidence that these factors
11Roll examines some of these factors, and others that we do not even mention, and ﬁnds little or no explanatory
power albeit, however, in a linear framework.
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may also play an important role in FCOJ futures pricing.
Motivated by Roll’s (1984) analysis of Wall Street Journal (WSJ) stories, we supplement our
analysis by searching the WSJ for articles about FCOJ futures from January 1, 1984 to November
11, 1998. However, in contrast to Roll, who emphasizes that there are many articles about the
weather, we wish to focus more on other factors. During this period of 3686 days, there were
a total of 384 articles in the WSJ about FCOJ. We then classiﬁed these articles into one of six
categories related to the focal point of the article, namely news about (i) weather, (ii) production,
(iii) Brazil, (iv) demand, (v) technical factors, and (vi) miscellaneous. For example, a news article
about Brazil might relate to information about export prices, shipment delays, tariﬀ rates, and
Brazilian weather such as droughts. In contrast, demand stories relate to changes in the movement
of FCOJ, behavior patterns of consumers, competing products, and retail sales. The results are
reported in Tables 9 and 10.
Table 9 shows that on days associated with WSJ news, the volatility is substantially higher than
on days associated with no WSJ news. In particular, the variance is 3.85 times larger on news days.
Furthermore, the direction of the FCOJ price movement coincides with the news content, e.g., 0.97%
versus -1.23% on news about low versus high temperatures, respectively.12 Most interesting is that
of the 384 WSJ stories, less than one-third were about weather, and more than 40% were either
about U.S. production or Brazil. Moreover, these stories were associated with return volatilities
close to or greater than those of weather-related stories. This is strong anecdotal evidence that
other information seems relevant for the FCOJ market.
Table 10 provides the distribution of news stories across months. Unsurprisingly, the weather-
related articles generally occurred in winter months. However, stories about Brazilian FCOJ pro-
duction occur throughout the year, which suggests that important information gets released during
spring and summer months. Finally, while the WSJ writes some stories about production in winter
and early spring months, October is by far the most important month.13. As discussed below,
12It should be noted that there is a self-selection problem at work here. On days in which FCOJ futures prices
moved, WSJ reporters might look for a story to ﬁt the futures price movement. Alternatively, on days with more
interesting stories, the WSJ might ignore news about FCOJ futures. In either case, the reader should be cautious
interpreting these results beyond the anecdotal nature of the evidence.
13Roll also notes stories about USDA crop forecasts but states that they are immaterial for explaining return
variability. Bauer and Orazem (1994) provide a detailed analysis of USDA forecasts and FCOJ returns
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October is an important month as it represents the ﬁrst oﬃcial government forecast of orange
production for the forthcoming season.
4.1 Production Data
Table 4A shows that the variability of FCOJ futures returns in the fall season is about 40% greater
than the spring and summer seasons. Why? Is there something special about fall? It clearly cannot
be the temperature level as no freeze has actually occurred in the fall season (September through
November).14 However, as mentioned above, an important event occurs every October with respect
to orange production–the USDA releases its ﬁrst production forecast of the season. In fact, the
USDA provides a prediction of year-end total orange production on a monthly basis from October
to July. Usually in August, the USDA issues a report stating the actual annual production for
the previous crop year. At the beginning of each month, the USDA sends out surveys to growers
to report their expected production as of the ﬁrst of the month. Then, the production forecasts
are complied from the survey data and released in the second week of the month. Since October
represents the ﬁrst release of the upcoming orange production forecast, it seems reasonable to
assume that it may have special importance; however, other monthly forecast releases may also be
relevant.
We collected the monthly USDA production forecast, which is the USDA forecast of the year-end
orange production of Florida, for the period 1967-1996. Consequently, we have 30 announcement
days in each month, which represents about 5% of the total trading days within the month. In order
for these forecasts to aﬀect returns, in a rational setting, they must contain useful information about
future production. One way to assess their information content is analyze the implied temporal
resolution of uncertainty. Table 11, Panel A documents the cross-sectional volatility of USDA
production forecasts errors, where the forecast errors are calculated as the percentage diﬀerence
between the current forecast and ﬁnal production level. Volatilities are calculated for each month
across the 30 years in the sample. Two observations are in order. First, there is signiﬁcant
production uncertainty in October in both freeze and non-freeze years, conﬁrming the evidence
from Table 3. Thus, whether a freeze takes place is not the only relevant factor for production and
thus pricing. Second, the resolution of uncertainty occurs slowly throughout the year. Little or
14This is not quite correct as a mild freeze did occur within our sample on November 25, 1970.
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no relevant information comes out in November or December, but after that there is a noticeable,
albeit somewhat uneven, monthly decline in uncertainty. Not surprisingly, a great deal of production
information is revealed during January and February in freeze years. In non-freeze years, the smaller
amount of uncertainty is resolved later in the season.
These facts together give support for the existence of important fundamental information other
than temperature. One possibility is that this information is actually revealed to the market on
USDA announcement dates. However, it is also plausible that the USDA production forecasts
lag market information. For example, the State of Florida releases crop damage estimates after
signiﬁcant freezes, which may precede and subsume the information in the subsequent USDA an-
nouncement. Table 11, Panel B, examines return volatility on USDA announcement dates. We
report the daily standard deviation of returns on these days and the daily standard deviation on
the remaining non-announcement days. Freeze days are excluded from the sample since they have
already been studied extensively. The results are quite striking and consistent with the theory.
The standard deviation of FCOJ futures returns on the October USDA announcement day is 9.3%,
which is in the same range as the volatility around freezing temperatures. Incredibly, this one day
in October represents over 65% of October return variance, 40% of the total variability in the fall
season, and more than 7% of the total return variance. While the results for other months are
less impressive, announcement days still coincide with up to 16% of the return variance within
the month despite the fact that they only account for 5% of the days. The only exceptions to
this pattern are November and December, when it is clear from Panel A that the USDA forecasts
contain little or no information.
Consistent with theory, volatility is high on the days with the most news about production. The
direction of these FCOJ futures return movements are also consistent with theory. For example,
Bauer and Orazem (1994) look at the relation between production surprises and FCOJ futures
returns, and ﬁnd a strong negative correlation. They document, for example, that the October
forecast explains over two-thirds of the price movement volatility on that day.15 Moreover, the
above results are consistent with the WSJ news story analysis documented in Tables 9 and 10.
15Using our sample, we also conﬁrm Bauer and Orazem’s (1994) ﬁndings. It is also possible to improve their model’s
ﬁt by taking into account nonlinearities similar in spirit to Section 3.1. For brevity, the results are not reported in
the tables.
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Both the volatility and direction of FCOJ futures returns are consistent with the WSJ writing
stories about FCOJ in October. As mentioned in an earlier footnote, while there is a sample
selection issue, the WSJ analysis, and volatility results here, are consistent with a relation between
asset prices and fundamentals.
4.2 Brazil
Table 3 documents that the average return for the winter season is related to weather as one might
expect. While this result represents only an average ﬁnding, the data itself is fairly noisy. What
other types of news might aﬀect prices?
Market imperfections aside (e.g., tariﬀs, import quotas, and transactions costs), the U.S. price
of oranges relevant for FCOJ should reﬂect the world price of these oranges. This world price
in turn depends on the interaction of the worldwide demand for and supply of oranges. Thus,
a downward shift in U.S. supply does not necessarily map one-to-one with an increase in FCOJ
prices. Moreover, volatility of FCOJ prices in general will depend on information about aggregate
supply and demand beyond the U.S.
Brazil and the U.S. account for over 85% of worldwide production of orange juice, with almost
all U.S. production being consumed domestically and Brazil production being exported. The origin
of FCOJ production in Brazil dates to the 1960’s. The motivation for the development was the
big freeze that destroyed a great part of the American groves, namely the 13 million adult orange
trees that died in 1962 (see Table 1). Since the U.S. industry did not have enough raw materials to
supply both their domestic market and the worldwide market, Brazil ﬁlled the gap by accelerating
the development of their orange production and processing plants. In fact, by 1984, Brazil was the
largest producer of FCOJ worldwide.
Interestingly, similar to the U.S. market and its reliance on the Orlando area, the majority of
oranges are produced in one area of Brazil, namely Sao Paolo. However, unlike Orlando’s predica-
ment with respect to weather, it is droughts rather than freezes that aﬀect Brazilian production.16
The drought season in Brazil starts in July and ends in November. Total Brazilian supply is hence
16Since Brazilian groves are frost-free, summer droughts are usually the weather risk. In general, the state of Sao
Paulo is especially suitable for the production of high quality oranges. It is characterized by an absence of frost,
coupled with dry winter and heavy summer precipitation. This annual moisture pattern tends to result in a single
blooming period, but does subject FCOJ production to droughts.
27
known by the winter season in the U.S., but may vary year-to-year. Dry weather may retard or
damage buds that bear next season’s harvest. Therefore, Brazil’s news on production usually starts
at the beginning of March.
Table 12, Panel A reports summary statistics for both the level and change in U.S. production of
FCOJ, U.S. imports of Brazilian FCOJ and Brazilian exports of FCOJ over the 1977-1996 period.
As seen from the table, the mean levels of production in the U.S. and Brazil are of similar magnitude,
with the U.S. importing approximately 30% of its FCOJ. While there has been no marked change
in the imports of FCOJ through the years, the level of production in both Brazil and the U.S. has
drifted up. To understand the implications of these results more fully, consider the following facts
about FCOJ: (i) the U.S. is a net importer of FCOJ, (ii) the worldwide supply curve of oranges in
any given year is fairly inelastic (i.e., the production levels are ﬁxed, irrespective of price), and (iii)
the U.S. demand curve has a higher slope than worldwide demand because, at the very least, it is
a subset of that demand.
Given these facts, there are two important implications for the interaction of U.S. production
and Brazilian imports and exports. First, relative to what imports would have been without a
freeze, one would expect imports to go up (down) given a negative (positive) supply shock in the
U.S. Second, and similarly, one would expect imports to go up (down) given a positive (negative)
supply shock in Brazil. As a ﬁrst pass, and making the strong assumption that the previous year’s
level represents our expectations of future imports, we estimated the correlation between import
changes of FCOJ and both changes in U.S. production and Brazil exports. As predicted, the
correlations are -0.36 and 0.56, respectively.
Table 12, Panel B looks more closely at the interaction between U.S. imports and supply
shocks in the U.S. and Brazil. In particular, we report the magnitude of the average change in
U.S. imports of FCOJ conditional on either negative or positive supply shocks to both U.S. and
Brazilian production. The results suggest that, for negative supply shocks, U.S. and Brazilian
FCOJ are close substitutes to the extent their magnitudes are similar. For example, conditional on
negative production in the U.S., the average drop in production is 23.91 million gallons (42 degrees
brix) while the corresponding imports of Brazilian FCOJ are 19.26 million gallons. Similarly, when
Brazilian production falls, the average drop is 25.34 million gallons with a corresponding 16.83
million gallon drop in U.S. imports. While a similar pattern emerges for positive supply shocks,
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there is less of an impact on imports, suggesting some nonlinearity in the demand curve or ﬁxed
transactions costs. As a ﬁnal analysis, we regress the change in imports jointly on both the change
in U.S. and Brazilian production levels. As expected, the coeﬃcients are negative for U.S. shocks
and positive for Brazil shocks. Moreover, the estimates are both statistically and economically
signiﬁcant. In fact, in terms of explained variation of import changes, these two components alone
explain 44%.
While this analysis is anecdotal in nature, it does illustrate two important facts: (i) Brazilian
imports are signiﬁcant in magnitude, and (ii) these imports are used as substitutes for domestic
production, especially during low production years (i.e., freeze years). To the extent that there is
information about Brazil’s FCOJ production, such as transport costs, tariﬀs, Sao Paolo weather,
and, more directly, Brazil’s FCOJ production and prices, this should get incorporated into FCOJ
futures prices. Thus, this factor represents another important component, not related to the tem-
perature level in Orlando. As supporting evidence, the WSJ news story analysis in Table 9 shows
that approximately 15% of all FCOJ stories are related to Brazil, and that on these days the
variance of FCOJ returns is more than three times that on non-news days.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper attempts to reverse the literature’s view that FCOJ futures returns are not explained by
fundamentals, particularly temperature. We present the following empirical facts that are strongly
supported by theory:
• Though covering only 4.5% of the days in winter, two-thirds of all winter return variance in
FCOJ futures coincide with freezing temperatures.
• On these days, using a simple, but theoretically appropriate nonlinear model of the relation
between FCOJ returns and weather, we can explain almost 50% of the variance. Moreover,
these R2s can increase to almost 65% if the model is extended to include market information
about forecasts.
• Other factors also play an important role in explaining FCOJ price variability. For example,
we document that over 40% of the fall season variance of FCOJ futures returns occurs on
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1.5% of the days. These days are easy to identify; they are the date of the ﬁrst USDA forecast
of orange production for the upcoming season, released in mid-October.
The bottom line from this paper is that when we have an understanding of the fundamental
information, both the FCOJ futures return variability and direction seems to coincide with theory.
Thus, this research suggests a strong link between FCOJ futures returns and their underlying
fundamentals.
In our opinion, it was this apparent lack of a strong link, as suggested by a low R2, that
made the FCOJ market such a prominently cited example of excess volatility. Now that we have
successfully addressed this issue, it will be tempting for behavioral economists to argue that the real
volatility puzzle for FCOJ returns is volatility during times other than freezes. Of course, all assets
- other commodities, equities, and bonds, among others - exhibit some volatility throughout the
year. Nevertheless, why is there volatility in FCOJ futures returns on days other than around low
temperatures or USDA production news? The pricing of FCOJ futures is, like any asset, extremely
complicated. The futures convenience yield, market microstructure, long-run news about weather,
news about orange quality, news events about Brazil, and short-run demand shifts, among many
other factors, can all have important eﬀects. Cursory evidence suggests that this is the case.
For example, on news days about Brazilian production, which tend to be in summer, there is
substantially higher volatility in the FCOJ futures market. If an econometrician could build the
correct structural model with all the relevant interactions and accurately measure the fundamentals,
we are conﬁdent that the vast majority of variability would be explained, just as we have done here
with respect to temperature. However, this is a diﬃcult, if not impossible, task. Even with respect
to FCOJ futures returns and temperature, the relation is nonlinear, multi-dimensional and state
and path dependent.
What our paper suggests about other assets and fundamentals, such as stock prices and earnings
announcements, is open for debate. However, our view is that equity pricing is likely to be even
more complex. For example, competition among ﬁrms is rampant and dynamic, information is
asymmetric and diﬃcult to interpret, and many value-relevant events are endogenous. Is the
impact of an earnings surprise diﬀerent, for example, if it is generated by revenue growth versus
cost cutting? Consequently, it is not surprising, at least to us, that equity returns cannot be
explained, even using ex post information. In our opinion, the literature has been too fast to
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embrace market irrationality as an explanation for perceived excess volatility. Just because we can
explain FCOJ futures return variability with fundamentals does not mean the same thing is true
for equities. On the other hand, just because we have not yet been able to explain equity return
variability is not a good reason by itself to reject market rationality. At the very least, we hope we
have made the point that the case for irrationality needs to involve much more than an examination
of results from linear regressions.
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Appendix: Return Calculation - Discussion of Limit Moves
In general we want to focus on the most liquid contracts, which are usually the ones closest to
maturity except when close to expiration. To that end we develop an algorithm that results in a
spliced return series which utilizes the most liquid contracts. Speciﬁcally, we make a distinction
between two types of periods: (i) trading days in an expiration month prior to expiration ( we
denote this period EXP), and (ii) the rest of the time, i.e., trading days in months in which no
contracts expire and trading days in an expiration month and past the expiration date of the
contract (we denote this period NoEXP). In period NoEXP we want to focus on the two near
maturity contracts C1 and C2:
• If neither contract hits its price limit, the return is the average return on C1 and C2.
• If C2 hits the limit and C1 does not, we calculate the return from C1 only.
• If C1 hits the limit and C2 does not, we average the returns on C1 and C2.
• If both contracts limit, we average the returns on C1 and C2 return and aggregate forward
until either is oﬀ-limit (and record the minimum temperature for the trading “day” as the
minimum temperature for the entire limiting period).
In period EXP we want to avoid using C1 due to the illiquidity that develops in futures contracts
close to expiration. Our rule above is then applied to C2 and C3 in a similar manner.17
17During the sample period a number of rules relevant for the calculation of returns were changed. First, with
respect to contract expiration dates, prior to November 1994 the expiration date was 10 business days prior to the
end of every other month. In the following period expiration was 14 business days prior to the end of the month. As
for the size of the price limits, initially it was 3 cents, and then it moved up to 5 cents in January 1979. From May
1986 there is no price limit on C1. From January 1993 there is no limit on the move in C2 during the expiration
month of C1.
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Date Low Temperature (Orlando area) Damage
February 7-9, 1835 11o Catastrophic
1857 NA Moderate
December 1, 1876 NA Moderate/Severe
January 9-13, 1886 19o Severe
December 29-30, 1894 18o Severe
February 8-9, 1895 17o Catastrophic
January 28-29, 1897 25o Moderate
January 2-3, 1898 23o Severe
February 13-14, 1899 20o Catastrophic
January 1900 27o Moderate
February 17-18, 1900 26o Moderate
December 21, 1901 26o Moderate/Severe
January 14, 1902 26o Severe
January 26-27, 1905 21o Severe
February 2-6, 1917 22o Severe
December 12-13, 1934 22o Severe
January 27-29, 1940 22o Severe
February 5-6& 11, 1947 24o Moderate/Severe
December 12-13, 1957 21o Moderate/Severe
January 9-10, 1958 260 Severe
February 4-5, 14, 17-19, 21, 1958 24o − 26o Severe
December 12-13, 1962 190 Severe/Catastrophic
January 31, 1966 23o Moderate
January 8-11, 1970 24o Moderate/Severe
January 20-22, 1971 22o Severe
January 19, 1977 20o Severe
January 12-14, 1981 18o Severe
January 11-12, 1982 23o Severe
December 24-25, 1983 24o Severe
January 20-22, 1985 19o Severe∗
December 26-27, 1985 26o Moderate
January 28, 1986 27o Moderate
February 24, 1989 29o Moderate
December 23-24, 1989 25o Severe
January 8-9, 1996 29o Moderate
February 5-6, 1996 26o Moderate
Table 1: History of Freezes
A list of the important freezes from 1835 to 1998 as documented by Attaway (1997). An important freeze
is one in which the temperature in the Orlando area (i) dropped substantially below freezing, and (ii)
remained at this level for a signiﬁcant period of time. The description of the freezes, varying from moderate
to catastrophic, is subjective, based on a description of the economic impact of the freezes provided in
Attaway (1997). Note that the * refers to the fact that, although each individual freeze in the 1981-85
period was severe, the combined eﬀect of four freezes in ﬁve years was generally considered catastrophic.
Our sample period is 1967-98 and therefore covers the freezes below the horizontal line.
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Critical Temperatures for Oranges
Winter Spring
(Dec to mid-Feb) (mid-Feb to Mar)
Bloom NA 29-30
Fruit 26 29
Leaves 24 27
Twigs 22 24
Branches 20 22
Severity of Freeze (Damage vs. Time)
Temperature Duration Consequence
28 6 hours or more Extensive Fruit Damage
26 4 hours or more Extensive Fruit Damage
24 2 hours or more Extensive Fruit Damage
20 4 hours or more Extensive Tree Damage
Freeze Recovery Periods
Minimum No. of Years
Freeze Type Temperature to Recovery
Light 32-29 0
Moderate 28-25 0
Hard 24-21 1-3
Severe Less than 20 3-7
Table 2: Temperatures and Orange Production Damage
Critical temperatures and durations and freeze recovery periods for orange trees. Source: Citrus
Associates of New York Cotton Exchange, Inc, 1994
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Production Cumulative
Year Freeze Change (%) Return(%)
67 4.7 -12.6
68 4.6 31.1
69 Yes -3.7 -8.4
70 Yes -15.3 16.2
71 5.0 -14.6
72 -2.5 -6.2
73 3.6 -16.1
74 -0.4 -19.5
75 5.3 -2.1
76 Yes -10.6 52.7
77 2.3 -0.7
78 -1.8 -7.8
79 3.3 -12.2
80 Yes -15.1 44.5
81 Yes -24.2 -0.6
82 -2.4 -12.6
83 Yes -30.5 30.1
84 Yes -12.7 -3.3
85 Yes -9.7 -27.7
86 -7.2 0.2
87 6.2 -4.1
88 Yes -3.6 -14.9
89 Yes -15.2 55.0
90 -8.1 1.6
91 2.8 -16.1
92 0.3 -34.3
93 1.4 7.1
94 4.8 -9.8
95 Yes 0.6 -3.5
96 2.8 -23.6
Frz -12.7 12.7
Non-Frz 1.3 -6.1
Table 3: Freezes, Production and Returns
Year by year percentage diﬀerences between actual orange production and the October USDA fore-
cast at the beginning of the season, and the cumulative FCOJ futures return over the corresponding
winter season (December to February). The bottom two rows show the averages of these numbers
over freeze years and non-freeze years. Seasons are classiﬁed as freeze/non-freeze based on Attaway
(1997).
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Panel A: Seasonal Returns
Season Obs Mean (%) SD (%) % Obs % Var
All 7543 0.033 2.105 100.0 100.0
Winter 1772 0.009 3.160 23.5 52.9
Pre-Freeze 1475 0.015 3.305 19.6 48.2
Post-Freeze 297 -0.020 2.315 3.9 4.8
Fall 1878 0.068 1.847 24.9 19.2
Spring 1939 0.059 1.555 25.7 14.0
Summer 1954 -0.002 1.539 25.9 13.9
Panel B: Temperature-Sorted Returns (Winter Pre-Freeze)
From-To Obs Mean (%) SD (%) % Obs % Var
0-99 1475 0.015 3.305 100.0 100.0
0-35 77 2.721 11.815 5.2 69.4
36-40 134 -0.311 2.163 9.1 4.0
41-45 198 -0.273 2.081 13.4 5.4
46-99 1066 -0.086 1.790 72.3 21.3
Table 4: FCOJ Futures Returns
Means and standard deviations of daily FCOJ futures returns in percent for diﬀerent seasons and
temperature ranges, and the percentage of the variance of returns accounted for by the observations
in each season/temperature range. Continuous futures daily return series are constructed oﬀ of the
three closest maturity contracts in a manner described in Appendix 1. The data period is Septem-
ber 1967 to August 1998. Temperatures are the minimum temperature for the Orlando region,
contemporaneous with the close-to-close futures return. Winter season is deﬁned as December,
January and February; Spring is March, April and May; Summer is June, July and August; and
Fall is September, October and November. The pre-freeze period includes days up to and including
the ﬁrst freeze of the season, if a freeze occurs.
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α β β1 β2 R
2
Winter Pre-Freeze
Linear 2.187 -0.042 0.015
(0.474) (0.009)
Piecewise 0.281
0− 35 58.113 -1.741
(8.409) (0.262)
36− 40 7.714 -0.211
(5.419) (0.142)
41− 45 6.620 -0.159
(4.590) (0.106)
46− 99 -0.558 0.008
(0.499) (0.009)
Nonlinear -0.135 0.095 0.202 0.333
(0.071) (0.339) (0.031)
Kernel 0.336
Full Sample
Nonlinear 0.003 -0.509 0.253 0.162
(0.022) (0.187) (0.018)
-0.006 1.971 0.141
(0.022) (0.056)
Table 5: Model Estimates and R2s
Estimation results for the four models of FCOJ futures returns as a function of contemporaneous
minimum temperatures as described in Section 3.1. The data period is September 1967 to August
1998. The winter, pre-freeze period includes days in December, January and February up to
and including the ﬁrst freeze of the season, if a freeze occurs. Continuous futures return series
are constructed oﬀ of the three closest maturity contracts in a manner described in Appendix 1.
Returns are in percent per day. Temperatures are the minimum daily temperature for the Orlando
region, contemporaneous with the close-to-close futures return.
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Const. Wt−1 Wt−2 Ft−1(Wt) R2
Wt 13.96 0.74 0.56
(1.22) (0.02) 853
Wt 18.11 0.70 -0.04 0.46
(1.49) (0.03) (0.03) 853
Wt 0.10 0.46 -0.03 0.56 0.73
(1.23) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 853
Wt−1 Wt−2 Dec. Jan. Feb. R2
Wt 0.67 -0.07 21.05 19.77 20.51 0.41
(0.02) (0.02) (1.03) (1.05) (1.08) 1877
Forecast Temperature
All Winter Dec Jan Feb 0-32 33-40 0-32 33-40
Prob (%) 0.70 2.66 1.57 4.75 1.53 43.75 4.29 32.00 6.69
Obs 7756 1877 636 653 588 16 70 50 254
Table 6: Temperature Forecasting
Estimation results for the temperature forecasting models as described in Section 3.2.1 and con-
ditional freeze probabilities. Conditional probabilities are the probability of observing a minimum
temperature less than or equal to 32o, conditional on the season/month, previous day’s forecast,
and previous day’s temperature. Temperatures are the minimum daily temperature for the Or-
lando region and forecasts are one-day ahead minimum temperature forecasts. Standard errors are
in parentheses under the coeﬃcient estimates, and the number of observations in each regression
appear under the regression R2s.
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α β1 β2 Bucket R20−35 R236−40 R241−45 R245−99 R20−99
-0.09 0.24 – Ft(Wt+1) 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.11) (0.15) 26 38 70 309 443
-0.07 – 0.02 Wt+1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.11) (0.11) 21 30 60 332 443
-0.09 0.52 -0.26 Ft(Wt+1) 0.24 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01
(0.11) (0.23) (0.17) 26 38 70 309 443
Wt+1 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.01
21 30 60 332 443
0.01 – 0.12 Wt+1 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.06) (0.07) 79 132 197 1056 1464
Table 7: Error Analysis - Forecasts
Estimation results from error analysis regressions, where the errors are from a winter pre-freeze
kernel regression of returns on contemporaneous minimum temperatures. The model, described in
Section 3.2.1, has contemporaneous forecasts and future temperature as explanatory variables. The
R2 is calculated within buckets, sorted by the forecast or the temperature, as denoted in column
“Bucket”. Data is for days where forecasts are available, except the ﬁnal regression, which is for all
winter pre-freeze days except freeze days (hence 1464 days: 1475 winter pre-freeze observations less
11 freeze days in our sample). Standard errors are in parentheses under the regression estimates,
and the number of observations in each bucket appear under the bucket R2s.
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α β1 β2 β3 β4 Bucket R20−35 R236−40 R241−45 R245−99 R20−99
-0.07 0.00 -1.58 0.48 - Ft−1(Wt) 0.24 -0.01 0.27 0.00 0.11
(0.11) (0.06) (0.27) (0.11) 26 37 70 310 443
Wt 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11
20 30 59 334 443
-0.07 - - - 0.05 Ft−1(Wt) -0.02 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00
(0.11) (0.06) 26 37 70 310 443
Wt 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00
20 30 59 334 443
Table 8: Error Analysis - Temperature Surprises
Estimation results from error analysis regressions, where the errors are from a winter pre-freeze
kernel regression of returns on contemporaneous minimum temperatures. The model, described
in Section 3.2.1, has contemporaneous temperature surprises (temperature less the prior day’s
forecast) as the explanatory variable, grouped by the level of the temperature and the forecast.
The R2 is calculated within a bucket, sorted by the forecast or the temperature, as denoted in
column “Bucket”. Data is for days where forecasts are available, for a total of 445 days. Standard
errors in parenthesis under regression estimates, and number of observations in each bucket appear
under bucket R2s.
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Sample Size Mean (%) SD (%)
News Day 384 0.015 3.06
No News Day 3302 -0.008 1.55
Weather 121 0.320 3.30
Production 101 -0.034 3.85
Brazil 58 0.554 2.95
Demand 21 0.065 2.90
Technical 50 0.307 2.80
Miscellaneous 33 -0.042 1.27
Weather (low) 73 0.966 3.112
(high) 48 -1.230 2.637
Production (low) 46 0.928 3.534
(high) 55 -0.869 2.437
Table 9: FCOJ Futures Returns and WSJ Events
The means and standard deviations of daily FCOJ futures returns on all the days the Wall Street
Journal (WSJ) reported some story about FCOJ futures. In particular, the sample covers all WSJ
articles from January 1, 1984 to November 11, 1998 in which FCOJ futures contracts were discussed.
This sample represents 3,686 trading days. Based on the content of the article, the stories were
broken down into one of six categories related to a particular fundamental factor: (i) weather, (ii)
production, (iii) Brazil, (iv) demand, (v) technical, or (vi) miscellaneous.
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Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept
Weather 4 12 41 45 21 7 0 0 1 0 2 0
Production 31 1 2 12 18 12 11 3 3 1 6 6
Brazil 6 3 3 9 3 9 3 6 9 4 3 2
Demand 0 2 3 0 0 3 1 4 1 3 3 1
Technical 3 7 3 3 3 5 8 3 6 7 2 4
Misc. 4 1 0 3 3 0 3 0 3 5 6 7
Table 10: Number of News Stories by Month
Distribution of news stories by month. News stories related to FCOJ as reported in the Wall Street
Journal from 1984-1998. The stories are broken down into one of six categories: (i) weather, (ii)
production, (iii) Brazil, (iv) demand, (v) technical and (vi) miscellaneous.
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Panel A: Production Uncertainty
Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul
Frz 12.9 12.9 13.6 11.9 6.1 3.5 3.7 2.4 1.8 0.4
Non-Frz 4.2 4.1 4.3 3.8 3.8 2.8 2.4 1.8 1.2 0.5
Panel B: Announcement Day Volatility
Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul
Ann. 9.258 1.542 2.530 2.488 3.046 2.190 2.294 2.790 2.139 1.670
Non-Ann. 1.464 1.510 2.531 2.315 1.651 1.651 1.372 1.452 1.455 1.597
% Ann. Days 4.6 5.0 4.9 4.9 5.3 4.6 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.7
% Variance 65.3 5.1 4.8 5.5 16.0 7.9 12.6 15.0 9.2 5.2
Table 11: Production Uncertainty
Panel A reports month by month volatility of the USDA production forecasts errors. Forecast
errors are calculated as the percentage diﬀerence between the forecast in a given month and the
ﬁnal production. The table reports the cross-sectional (across years) standard deviation of these
forecast errors. Panel B reports return volatility on the announcement day for each month, the
volatility for others days in the month, the percentage of days which are announcement days, and
the percentage of variance occuring on announcement days (freeze days are excluded from the
analysis).
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Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Change in Change in Change in
U.S Brazil U.S. Imports U.S Brazil U.S. Imports
Production Exports from Brazil Production Exports from Brazil
Mean 237.3 253.8 99.0 6.7 17.0 1.3
Std. Dev. 33.9 102.1 38.1 31.7 54.4 29.5
Corr. with ∆ Imp. -0.36 0.56
Panel B: Explaining Imports
Average
∆ U.S. ∆ Brazil ∆ U.S.
State Production Exports Imports
∆ U.S. Prod.>0 24.5 -9.1
∆ U.S. Prod.<0 -23.9 19.3
∆ Brazil Exp.>0 64.0 21.5
∆ Brazil Exp<0 -25.3 -16.8
Regression Results
Const. ∆ U.S. Prod. ∆ Brazil Exp. R2
∆ U.S. Imp. -1.56 -0.34 0.30 44.4
(5.74) (0.17) (0.10)
Table 12: U.S. and Brazilian FCOJ Production
Panel A reports means, standard deviations and correlations for the level an annual change in
U.S. production, Brazilian exports, and U.S. imports from Brazil of FCOJ for the sample period
1977-96. All quantities are in millions of gallons (42 degrees brix). Panel B reports average annual
changes in U.S. production, Brazilian exports, and U.S. imports from Brazil of FCOJ conditional on
positive and negative changes in the former two variables. It also reports results from a regression
of changes in imports on changes in U.S. production and Brazilian exports.
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Figure 1: Minimum Temperatures
Daily minimum temperatures over the sample period, September 1967 to August 1998. The Hori-
zontal line represents 32o.
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Figure 2: R2s by Temperature Bucket
R2s by temperature buckets for the four models described in Section 3.1. The temperature buckets
are ≤ 35, 36-40, 41-45 and ≥ 46. The R2s refer to models performed in winter months, pre-freeze.
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Figure 3: Fitted Returns
Fitted daily returns versus contemporaneous realized temperature for the four models described in
Section 3.1. The analysis was performed in winter months, pre-freeze.
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